Criminal law · Theory and practice
Individualized Sentencing for Multiple Offenses
Grouping convictions, the single most severe sentence, increases, and credit for punishment served
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US-English translation · Bulgarian law · Български оригинал
Abstract
This analysis concerns the sequence for determining punishment for several offenses. It distinguishes individual sentences, permissible groups, and the single most severe aggregate sentence. It examines the chronological requirements of Articles 23 and 25 of the Criminal Code, the most favorable lawful grouping, and the limits on increases under Article 24. Addition of supplementary penalties, credit for punishment already served, and the relationship to a subsequent offense under Article 27 are considered separately. Interpretative case law, a numerical example, and procedural guidance show why correct arithmetic is insufficient without the correct legal sequence.
Keywords: multiple offenses; concurrence; aggregate sentence; grouping convictions; Article 24 of the Criminal Code; credit for time served; individualized sentencing.
Contents of the article
1. Multiple offenses require more than arithmetic
Individualized sentencing for multiple offenses combines two tasks: fair punishment of each separate offense and lawful determination of the overall penal consequence. Omitting the first produces an opaque aggregate sanction; omitting the second produces unlawful accumulation or absorption of sentences.
Article 23 of the Criminal Code requires a sentence for each offense first, followed by imposition of the most severe where the concurrence requirements are met. Article 25 extends those rules to separate judgments. Article 24 permits a reasoned increase within statutory limits. These are sequential legal operations, not a free choice between an “aggregate” and a “summed” sentence. [1]
The analysis argues that a complete chronology of the offenses and the dates when judgments became final is decisive. Sentence lengths are compared only after the legally permissible groups have been established. The most favorable combination means the most favorable lawful solution, not arbitrary aggregation of all convictions.
2. Classifying the multiplicity before sentencing
Before grouping, it must be determined whether there are several offenses or one offense involving complex activity. A continued offense under Article 26 is not punished by mechanically assigning a separate sentence to every included episode and then grouping them. In real or ideal concurrence, by contrast, the individual offenses retain their independence. [1]
Not every later conviction amounts to recidivism in relation to an earlier one. What matters is when the act was committed, not only when judgment was delivered. An offense discovered later may have been committed before the first final conviction and fall within concurrence. The criminal record must therefore be supplemented with precise relevant dates and the contents of judicial decisions.
Repetition and dangerous recidivism have their own statutory requirements and cannot be inferred solely from the number of entries. Several convictions may relate to concurrent offenses without that fact alone establishing the corresponding aggravating feature. [1]
3. The individual sentence remains the mandatory foundation
When considering several charges, the court must individualize punishment for each offense under Article 54 and the applicable special rules. The activity's overall social dangerousness does not justify omitting reasons for individual sentences. The seriousness of the particular offense, motives, personality, and mitigating and aggravating circumstances must be established. [1]
It is incorrect to inflate the sentence for a less serious offense artificially because it will later be absorbed. Individual sentences retain legal significance if a conviction is altered or removed, during regrouping, and when other consequences are assessed. The “practical end result” cannot justify an unlawful intermediate step.
Article 56's prohibition against double counting circumstances already incorporated into the definition of the offense must also be respected. Multiplicity may be relevant to the aggregate sentence, but does not allow the same circumstance, without differentiation, to aggravate the classification, the individual sentence, and the increase in the aggregate sentence. [1]
4. Forming groups and choosing the most favorable combination
For each proposed group, it must be checked whether all offenses were committed before a judgment for any one of them became final. Temporal proximity or trial in the same proceedings is insufficient. The condition is substantive and chronological. [1]
One offense may be concurrent with two others that cannot themselves be included in the same group. Different permissible combinations then arise. The same conviction cannot be used simultaneously in two groups to absorb two separate sets of sentences.
Interpretative Decision No. 3 of November 16, 2009, in interpretative case No. 3/2009 of the General Assembly of the Criminal Division requires a comprehensive examination of convictions and the most favorable lawful grouping for the offender. A new conviction may require reassessment of previously formed groups; without a new relevant basis, the same issue cannot be arbitrarily decided again. [2]
The practical model is comparative. Every permissible combination is identified, sentences remaining outside groups are specified, and the actual legal consequences are compared. Comparing only the longest term within one group may mislead if other sentences, enforcement, and credits are ignored.
5. Determining the single most severe aggregate sentence
Once a permissible group is formed, the most severe sentence is identified. Where sentences are of the same type, duration or amount is generally central, but statutory rules for different types and additional penalties must be considered. Probation and imprisonment cannot be freely combined into a new sanction not provided by law. [1]
Article 23(2) regulates addition of public censure and certain deprivations of rights. Where the same rights are withdrawn, the longest term is relevant. For fines and confiscation, paragraph 3 separately permits full or partial addition under the specified conditions. The operative part must clearly record each decision. [1]
Confiscation as punishment must not be confused with forfeiture of the subject matter, instrumentality, or proceeds under Article 53. Civil damages and costs likewise are not penalties automatically absorbed by the most severe aggregate sentence. Each consequence requires its own legal basis. [1]
6. An increase under Article 24: a possibility, not an automatic result
Where sentences are of the same type, Article 24 permits increasing the most severe aggregate sentence by up to one half. The statute sets two further limits: the increased sentence must not exceed the sum of the individual sentences or the maximum for that type of punishment. All three limits apply simultaneously. [1]
The following example is hypothetical. With lawful sentences of three, two, and one years' imprisonment in one permissible concurrence, the most severe aggregate sentence is three years. An increase by half reaches four years and six months, not six years. This is only the permissible ceiling in the model, not a mandatory sentence. The court must justify whether any increase is necessary and, if so, its amount.
The reasons cannot stop at observing that more than one offense exists: that is already a prerequisite of concurrence. The court must assess whether absorption is sufficient for the purposes in Article 36 in light of the specific criminal activity and the offender. Number, intensity, and variety may matter, but must be connected to the need for a more severe overall response.
An increase is not a means of compensating for disagreement with individual sentences already final. The grouping court does not covertly review their fairness. It applies an independent statutory mechanism to the established group.
7. Credit for punishment served and the question of enforcement
When determining an aggregate sentence under separate judgments, Article 25 regulates credit for punishment served in full or in part. Accurate enforcement data are material: periods of imprisonment, probation served, and other relevant credits. A general statement that the person “has already served some time” is insufficient. [1]
The statute provides a specific ratio for crediting probation against imprisonment: two days of probation for one day of imprisonment. This is not a general formula allowing free substitution of punishments outside the prescribed cases. Pretrial detention and other restrictions must be credited under their separate applicable rules, without crediting the same period twice. [1]
If execution of a sentence was suspended, enforcement of the aggregate sentence is decided when that sentence is determined. Suspension does not automatically carry over to every new group. All conditions, probationary periods, and possible rules activating suspended imprisonment must be examined. [1]
8. The boundary with a subsequent offense under Article 27
Article 27 regulates a different relationship: a new offense committed after a final sentence of imprisonment but before the punishment has been served. This is not ordinary concurrence under Article 23. The statute provides for adding the unserved portion and special conditions requiring its addition in full. [1]
The phrase “cumulation of all judgments” is therefore too vague. It can conceal entirely different legal operations. Some offenses form concurrence, others stand in a subsequent-offense relationship, and others produce consequences concerning a suspended sentence. A single overall chronology is needed, but different statutory regimes must be applied.
Rehabilitation, extinguishing effects, and features of individual convictions likewise cannot be resolved through an automated record check. Where relevant, the court must establish whether they have occurred and their implications for the issue. The technical existence of an entry does not always exhaust the conviction's legal status.
9. Competent court, procedure, and judicial review
Article 39 of the Criminal Procedure Code assigns competence for an aggregate sentence under judgments of different courts to the court that delivered the judgment becoming final last. It does not automatically select the court imposing the heaviest penalty. Proceedings under Article 306(1), item 1, allow a ruling on the aggregate sentence. [3]
Interpretative Decision No. 3/2009 emphasizes complete criminal-history data and mandatory jurisdiction. Examination cannot be limited to a selection of judgments convenient to one party. A final grouping decision has legal significance that cannot be disregarded without a new relevant basis or the appropriate extraordinary procedure. [2]
A reasoned application should contain not merely a case list but offense dates, finality dates, sentences, enforcement information, and a specific proposed lawful combination. An objection to an increase or credit must identify the precise legal or calculation error.
10. Conclusion
Sentencing for multiple offenses is a sequence of legal assessments: correct differentiation of offenses, individual sentences, permissible groups, the single most severe aggregate sentence, a reasoned increase, addition of penalties, and credit for punishment served. An error at any stage may produce an unlawful final result even if the arithmetic appears persuasive.
A complete chronology and clearly differentiated statutory bases provide the most reliable protection against both unjustified aggravation and unlawful absorption of sanctions. The aggregate sentence must be individualized, reviewable, and determined within the law's limits.
Statutory sources and case law
- Criminal Code. Consolidated text in Lex.bg; the relevant provisions are identified in the discussion. Source check recorded in the original: September 14, 2026. Source text.
- Supreme Court of Cassation, General Assembly of the Criminal Division, Interpretative Decision No. 3 of November 16, 2009, in interpretative case No. 3/2009. Reasons and operative part addressing the aggregate sentence, regrouping, and the competent court. Official text. Source text.
- Criminal Procedure Code. Consolidated text in Lex.bg. Source check recorded in the original: September 14, 2026. Source text.
This article is a general discussion of legal theory and practice. A specific matter requires consideration of the law applicable at the relevant time and Article 2 of the Criminal Code. Hypotheticals serve legal analysis only and do not describe actual cases.